I don’t like the term “free will”. I’m not attached to it. Rather, I feel about it more like theological non-cognitivists, ignostics, or Yudkowskian “untheists” feel about God. If I were hypothetically creating a language from scratch for some alien planet, I wouldn’t even try to invent a concept so vague and pointless. “Freedom” — both positive and negative — seems to be a useful notion in general. But “freedom of the will” is another matter.
On the other hand, if I have to engage in debates about free will, I tend to favor compatibilist responses. If the term is vague anyway and there are various possible ways to define it, why not prefer compatibilist approach?
In particular, we may consider the idea that freedom is about controlling the future through our choices. In this sense, free will implies at least some degree of determinism, because control depends on causal connections between events. And it directly conflicts with stochasticity, since the more stochastic/random the future is, the less control we have over it. (See also the “luck objection” to libertarian free will.) Yeah, this sounds counterintuitive to many people. But there are other compatibilist approaches too.